"..And, apparently, we are hitting, so to speak, the distributed networks, various substations, and we should hit the sources. And we are not hitting the sources, because there are two nuclear power plants that provide this electricity. Well, it's not good to hit nuclear power plants. Why is it dangerous to hit nuclear power plants? Well, that's very dangerous. Dangerous for whom? And dragging this out for years is not dangerous. Well, and the same, so to speak, with solar energy and so on, and so on, and so on, and with all these matters. That is, it seems that the systematic nature and power of these strikes is increasing, but for now it is still not the kind that can cut critically and for a long time. ..."
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Well, to be honest, it's not the first year. We've been talking about this for a long time, including other various missiles. Here, you see, the substantive discussion or serious discussion on this matter has become, in my opinion, largely meaningless simply because the same theses are repeated all the time. And here, in general, there are, so to speak, two or three versions, yes, and they are very simple. The first, what I've been talking about all the time, I believe that, essentially, discussing their plans comes down to the lack or inadequacy of our reaction, or, so to speak, in changing its quality. That is, so to speak, if they do not see a threat or problem for themselves, they will advance all these their red lines of weapon delivery and everything else, but until they reach the throat.
And in this sense, time is extremely important here, because what could have been done a year ago, two years ago, if it is not done, it only prolongs the war. And all this argumentation like 'we are doing this for humanitarian reasons' becomes very doubtful because the longer the war lasts, the more people will die. So here, honestly, I don't see any humanism. Well, and this also applies to strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, on the Ukrainian leadership, and so on. I've already said all this a thousand times. And if that's the case, then we should then, so to speak, understand, what is our response? I cannot answer for our responses, I only say what, in my opinion, needs to be done. And what will be done, what is thought about this, what is known about this, somewhere up there, we don't know with you. This means point one. I just keep talking about it all the time. Point two. We also periodically encounter various conspiracy theories on various internet resources and channels, like, you don't understand anything, in fact, Trump and Putin have long agreed, and they just stage some kind of show and so on.
All this is needed in order to then shape a situation where everyone will be winners. I do not exclude that this is possible. Honestly, back in 1922-1923, I talked about this, including on television, that, judging by how the SCO went, and it went, of course, not as they originally intended, it is also obvious, it may end with a certain scenario. A scenario where all sides will say that they are in the plus. And then the question is only where and at what point this period or ellipsis will be put. And is it possible that something similar was discussed by Putin and Trump? Possible. Theoretically. But some hints can be extracted, if one really wants to. For example, let's say, from the message that at the recent CIS and Central Asia summit, Putin had a closed-door conversation with the leaders of Central Asian countries and told them something about his meeting with Trump. Maybe he calmed them down, gave them hope, told them something like that. Although, of course, it seems quite strange to me to say that if with the leaders of other countries this can be discussed, hoping that it will remain behind closed doors, but, it seems to me, this is also a bit doubtful.
Well, theoretically it is possible, but personally I don't believe in it. Why? Because, in fact, any secret agreements with the West almost always end very badly. Is there a reason to trust Trump specifically? I don't know. I believe that there is no reason to trust him as a friend or brother, of course. And as for any possible agreements, they must still be backed by some threats, including from our side. That is, here, so to speak, there may be some, so to speak, concessions as treats, or there may be, or rather should be, some threats. That is, let's agree, but if not, then what? So here, without some kind of system, so to speak, of incentives, including negative ones, it won't work out for the US. No such, so to speak, agreement, where, for us, only the stick, and for them, only the treats, no such agreement that could end successfully, can exist. But theoretically I do not exclude this, because, of course, it is clear that we do not possess, so to speak, the whole picture of what is happening, as it were, yes, and we are not at the level to know, to understand everything, you know.
Therefore, well, yes, maybe this is the case. Another version, when they say, I heard about this strange enough this very... Well, it seems to me, those who are involved in this, they write about it, right? That, like, we deliberately do everything so slowly because we are preparing for a big war with Europe. I think this is one of the most stupid versions that can possibly exist. Why? Because the slower we do it, the better Europe will prepare for this war. So, actually, that's all. The more time they get to restructure their industry, military-industrial complex, and everything else, the better they will consolidate themselves in that part of Ukraine that we do not reach or do not want to reach, or cannot, according to various versions. And so on, and so on. That is, this game is not in our favor, yes, if someone sees it that way. After all, in the end, we have already given them a very big head start in time, but what I am personally sure of is that the destruction of the Ukrainian leadership and infrastructure in 1922 would have seriously changed the course of all military actions.
And during this time, the Ukrainian, so to speak, military system has become much more, well, let's say, effective. And Europe has seriously changed all its priorities, investing money in the military-industrial complex and so on. Therefore, to think that we are doing it so slowly because we are preparing. I think if someone is preparing, then they are the first. This, so to speak, is the first. And secondly, again, if we talk about the war that could be, I think the most inconvenient option for Russia would be to conduct a ground war with conventional weapons. This is a losing option for us. We are preparing. If we are preparing for the same war as now in Ukraine, then we have lost. We have lost because NATO, of course, will have a huge advantage in a conventional ground war, and there will be almost no chance of winning it. And if we are still ready to use nuclear weapons in such a conflict, then it is better to indicate this immediately and unambiguously so that this war simply does not happen.
Why do we need to constantly talk about some big war? It feels like we have taken ourselves and pushed ourselves back into the pre-nuclear era. I constantly have the feeling that we have pushed ourselves back into the pre-nuclear era. As if nothing happened in the second half of the 20th century and so on. I think such versions from different analysts look either speculative or rather silly. If someone seriously thinks so, I think they are greatly mistaken. So there Zelensky went there, Zelensky went here, these said this, and those said that. Already, in general, so to speak, the discussion of this tactical agenda, I think, has simply ceased to have any meaning. Yes, because it's like a drum with these balls, you know, like in a lottery. And all the time the same numbers come up. Only they are not all winning. And that's how it is. So what can I say here? Well, he went, so to speak, well, yes, to discuss.
Yes, the question is what is happening behind the scenes, because if only what we see is happening, then we have already said everything. Well, I have already said everything, at least. In my opinion, we have limited our own possibilities. Or we don't have them, I don't know. I think they exist, but we have limited them for some unknown reasons. Theoretically, they can be assumed, but I don't know them for sure. And if there are some cunning plans, then there is also nothing to talk about, because we do not know them. I would very much like there to be some cunning plans, but we do not know them, and therefore there is also nothing to discuss there. Yesterday, I think, even Lukashenko said something very wise. So wise that it was difficult to understand. About Trump, who, of course, understands.
I think Trump doesn't understand. If we think he understands something, I think not. He behaves, in general, like a bandit who has found a weakness. And he uses it. Yes, maybe it's not like that. But so far all public actions indicate that it is more likely so. Yes, he hoped for something, to build some kind of scenery. Like what he did at the GAZ. But it didn't work out. Then let's put pressure. And everything else. Since they accept this pressure, well, let's keep pressing, and then we'll see. Because they are advancing their agenda. Yes, in principle, indeed, our troops are advancing slowly but surely. But it must be said that this advancement, however, is, of course, a positive fact. And, as Peskov said, it worsens Zelensky's negotiating positions. But strategically, in my opinion, it does not solve the issues if there is nothing else behind it. That's the first. Well, indeed, as far as I understand, we have increased the strength and systematic nature of strikes on the Ukrainian energy infrastructure, but they are still somewhat self-limiting. Here, too, everyone is scared of a cold winter, I think.
No one knows what kind of winter it will be, and I haven't believed the weather forecasters for a long time. I have heard five hundred thousand different forecast options, so to speak, about summer, super hot, then no, it will be super cold, then no, it will be normal, well, and so on, and so on. In general, in short, in the end they say, well, you saw what the summer was like, so, consider this, this was our forecast, yes. The same goes for winter. Now they say the winter will be severe, just severe. I don't know if it will be severe or not. We'll see. But with the structure of the energy infrastructure, there is such a thing. If they manage to restore it in a week or two, these are not critical strikes.
And, apparently, we are hitting, so to speak, the distributed networks, various substations, and we should hit the sources. And we are not hitting the sources, because there are two nuclear power plants that provide this electricity. Well, it's not good to hit nuclear power plants. Why is it dangerous to hit nuclear power plants? Well, that's very dangerous. Dangerous for whom? And dragging this out for years is not dangerous. Well, and the same, so to speak, with solar energy and so on, and so on, and so on, and with all these matters. That is, it seems that the systematic nature and power of these strikes is increasing, but for now it is still not the kind that can cut critically and for a long time.
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- Oct 15, 2025
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